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stances and assess such damages as will not only compensate the
injured party, but serve to warn and deter others from similar
acts, and their verdict will be disturbed only, if they a~sess outrageously excessive damages.
The measure of damages finally in cases where the negligence
results in death, is not uniform. The remedy being given by the
statute, the rule and measure of damages depends on such statute.
In some states pecuniary damages only may be recovered (Penn.
2?. B. Co. v. Zellie, 33 Penn. St. 318, 328, 329; Penn. B. R.
Co. v. Henderson, 51 Penn. St. 315, 320), while others seem
to allow exemplary damages (Bowler v. Lane, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 311,
318 ; Aurphy v. N
. . New Haven B. 1B. Co., 29 Conn. 496),
and still others give'a certain sum under certain circumstances, for
instance Missouri.
In endeavoring to treat of all the principai points that arise in
the subject spoken of in the foregoing pages, we were compelled
to be brief, and have, perhaps, sometimes been obscure. But we
hope that reference to the authorities cited will in such cases explain what is obscure.
CHRISTIAN KOERNER.
St. Louis, Mo.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF LOUISVILLE v. NATIONAL STATE
BANK, NEWARK, N. J.
The national banks have no lien upon shares of their capital stock for the security of the indebtedness of the owners and holders of such shares.
Where the owners of such shares assign them bond fide, in security for actual
fndebtedness, and give the creditor power to transfer such shares upon the books
of the bank, it creates such a lien in favor of the creditor as will be protected
under the Bankrupt Law of the United States.
Where, more than two years after the cieation of such lien, proceedings in bankruptcy are instituted and prosecuted to final discharge of the debtor without Fny
notice being taken by the assignee or the court of the indebtedness or the assignment of such shares in security, such discharge of the debtor will have no effect
ppon the lien created by the assignment, and the assignee may compel, in a court
of equity, the perfecting of his title to the shares so assigned upon the books of
the bank.
The present Bankrupt Law leaves it optional with the assignee in bankruptcy
whether or not to pursue property of the bankrupt which has been pledged or mortgaged for the security of the bankrupt's debts. If he is of opinion that anything
may be saved to the estate by paying the debt so secured and taking the property
VOL. IXIII.-36
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pledged or mortgaged, it is his duty to do so; but if he thinks otherwise, he should
abstain from the redemption of the property, and in such case, unless the creditor
claim to have the properly pledged or mortgaged applied upon the debt, and to
prove his claim for the balance, or to surrender the property to the assignee and
piove for his whole debt, there is no occasion to bring the matter into the proceedings in bankruptcy. The pledgee or mortgagee of property, not brought into the
proccedings in bankruptcy, may pursue his remedy upon the pledge or mortgage
in the state courts, the Federal courts having no exelusive jurisdiction over property
of the bankrupt which is not brought into the proceedings against him.

IN the year 1866, Spencer Scott, who was then the owner of
one hundred and seventy shares of the capital stock of the Second
National Bank of Louisville, and who was largely indebted to the
National State Bank of Newark, New Jersey, delivered to said
last-named bank, as a security for his indebtedness, the certificate
of his ownership of the stock in the Louisville bank. At the time
of delivery he signed the blank form of transfer printed on the
back of the certificate. He afterwards borrowed other sums of
money on the faith of this security, and finally the Newark bank,
pursuant to its authority in the premises, filled up the printed
form of transfer, which now reads as follows:"For value received, I hereby assign and transfer to the
National State Bank of Newark, New Jersey, all the shares of the
within-mentioned stock, and do hereby constitute and appoint V.
Rose, attorney to transfer the same on the books of the bank.
Witness my hand this third day of October 1866.
SPENCER SCOTT.

Attest, RICHARD SCHELL."
In March 1868, Rose, the attorney, applied to appellant to be
allowed to make the stipulated transfer, but permission was refused,
upon the ground, as claimed by appellant, that it held a lien on
the shares of stock so transferred, to secure the payment of certain
indebtedness from Scott to it. Subsequent to all this Scott filed
his petition in the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, and was adjudged a bankrupt, and upon final
hearing, was discharged from the payment of all debts provable
under the Bankrupt Act. To this proceeding appellee was not
made a party. It was not reported as a creditor of Scott, nor
was the bank-stock in its hands, reported as part of the estate of
the bankrupt. So far as the record showed it had no notice of the
proceedings in bankruptcy, further than might be implied from
the publications made pursuant to sections 14 and 29 of the Bankrupt Act.
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In May 1870, appellee brought its suit in equity in the Louisville Chancery Court, to compel the appellant to transfer upon its
books the shares of stock named in the certificate, in -accordance
with the assignment on the back thereof, and to account for the
dividends that had accrued on such shares of stock subsequent to
the 3d day of October 1866. As matter of defence, appellant
averred want of knowledge or information as to Scott's indebtedness to the Newark Bank, and as to the assignment or transfer of
the certificate of stock. Both these facts were satisfactorily established by the evidence in the case.
Bijur & -Davie and Lee & .Rodman, for the Second National
Bank.
Gazlay

' .Reinecke, for

the National State Bank.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINDSEY, J.-It is intimated that the arrangement betweenScott and the appellee was fraudulent, but as there is no direct or
specific charge of fraud the argument of counsel touching such
intimation need not be further noticed.
Appellant alleges that in 1866, when the transfer of the certificate of stock is claimed to have been made, and at all times after
that date, and up to the filing of Scott's petition in bankruptcy,
he was indebted to it in an amount greatly exceeding the value of
all the stock standing on its books in his name, and that under
and by virtue of its articles of association and by-laws, it held a
lien on said stock to secure the payment of all debts due and
owing by Scott.
It also alleges that it appeared in the Bankrupt Court and
proved its said debts and asserted its lien, and that it was recognised and upheld by said court. And fafther, that by agreement
with the assignee it was allowed to retain all the stock standing in
Scott's name, by crediting its debts by the agreed value thereof,
had that this arrangement or agreement was reported to and
approved by the court, and therefore that it holds the stock entirely freed from the claim of appellee, or of any one else.
. As-a second general ground of defence, appellant insists that
'the discharge granted to Scott extinguished appellee's debts, and
that as a necessary result its security was also extinguished, and
it also claims that, by reason of appellee's failure to appear in the
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Bankrupt Court and assert its lien, it has forfeited all right to
hold the stock as a security for its debts, and that it can now have
no relief at the hands of a state court.
The claim of the Louisville Bank to a lien on the stock, under
and by virtue of its articles of association or by-laws, cannot be
maintained. This question is settled beyond all controversy by
the two cases of the Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369, and Bullard,
Trustee, v. The -National -Eagle Bank. No banking association
organized under the National Currency Act of 1864 can create
or hold such liens.
If, therefore, appellant can hold the stock, under a claim of
title in itself, it must have acquired its title independent of such
supposed lien. Its claims of ownership must be supported by its
contract or agreement with the assignee of Scott, or by some order
or judgment of the Bankrupt Court.
An inspection of the record of the proceedings had in the Bankrupt Court in the matter of Spencer Scott developes the fact that
said court did not sell, nor attempt to sell, the stock in controversy, and did not, directly or indirectly, determine that appellant's
The assignee
lien on such stock was valid and enforceable.
reported to the court that the Second National Bank of Louisville
claimed a lien on this, as well as all other stock standing on its
books, in the name of Scott, and that its debts against the bankrupt amounted in the aggregate to more than the value of all such
stock. Upon the filing of this report, the R'gister was directed
to ascertain the validity and amount of all claims against the estate
of the bankrupt, and how much they, or any of them, should be
reduced on account of the creditors holding securities of any kind.
The Register ascertained the amount of appellant's claims, and
deducted therefrom the value of certain bank-stock, including the
stock in controversy, because, as he said, "said bank claims a lien
under their by-laws" on such stock. Upon reading this report,
the court ordered that it be confirmed and approved in all things,
and that the assignee should proceed to settle and distribute the
bankrupt's estate upon the basis suggested by the Register.
The validity of appellant's pretended lien was not called in question, and no order or judgment relating thereto was made or rendered. The court did not direct a sale of the stock, and hence
appellant cannot hold title to it as a purchaser from the court.
The assignee, not deeming it his duty to enter into a contest with
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appellant, exercised the power conferred on him by the 20th section
of the Bankrupt Act, and by agreement with appellant ascertained
the value of the stock, and deducted such value from the amount
of its claims against the bankrupt's estate. That agreement was
made out of court, and of course invested appellant with no other
or greater title than the assignee could lawfully dispose of. The
powers of that officer are in'no sense judicial, and his acts bind only
those whom he represents. In the sale of the estate of a bankrupt
he acts only for the creditors who prove their claims, and in such
matters he can conclude the rights of no one else.
Appellee did not prove its debts against Scott. It was not made
a party to the bankrupt proceedings. It was not called on by the
assignee, or by any creditor, to assert its lien on the stock in the
Bankrupt Court. Its rights, therefore, were not affected by any
act of the assignee. Such being the case, the claim of appellee
cannot be resisted, unless by its failure to prove its debts and assert its lien in the bankrupt proceedings it forfeited a right acquired
through a contract honestly made, and fully and completely executed months before Scott filed his petition in bankruptcy. It is
insisted with earnestness and zeal that appellee's interest in the
bank-stock was thus lost. We are referred to cases which seem to
support this construction of the various provisions of the Bankrupt
Act. Among others, the cases of .Davis, assignee v. Carpenter, 2
N. B. Reg. 391, and In re Snedalcer, 3 N. B. Reg. 629.
It is to be observed, however, that in each of these cases the secured creditor was required by the assignee to come into the Bankrupt Court and submit the validity of his debt, and the ascertainment and liquidation of his lien, to its adjudication. The courts
have asserted no greater jurisdiction in matters of bankruptcy
than that they- had power to afford the relief asked, and when
they assumed to decide that in cases of bankruptcy liens upon
or specific claims to portions of the bankrupt's estate must ex
necessitate be enforced in the Bankrupt Court, they were outside
of the cases before them, and their decisions are not, therefore, entitled to the same consideration as though they had been rendered
upon questions directly in issue. But aside from this, we are persuaded that the doctrine thus seemingly announced is contrary to
the spirit and intention of the Bankrupt Act, and in conflict with
the decided weight of authority.
The Bankrupt Act provides for the preservation of liens and se-
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curities of almost all descriptions.

The bankrupt courts are em-

powered, when called on by a party in interest, to ascertain and
liquidate all liens and other specific claims on the property of the
bankrupt, and for that purpose may compel all parties holding liens
or asserting claim to any portion of the bankrupt's estate to appear
before them, and submit said liens or claims to their adjudication.
But because they have this jurisdiction it by no means follows that
they must necessarily exercise it in all cases. The 20th section of
the act provides that "where a creditor has a mortgage or pledge
of real or personal property of the bankrupt, or a lien thereon, for
securing the payment of a debt owing to him from the bankrupt,
he shall be admitted as a creditor only for the balance of the debt
after deducting the value of such property, to be ascertained by
agreement between him and the assignee, or by a.sale thereof, to
be made in such manner as the court shall direct ;"""or the creditor may release or convey his claim to the assignee upon such
property, and be admitted to prove his whole debt. If the value
of the property exceeds the sum for which it is so held as security,
the assignee may release to the creditor the bankrupt's right of redemption thereon on receiving such excess, or he may sell the property subject to the claim of the creditor thereon, and in either case
the assigned and creditor respectively shall execute all deeds and
writings necessary or proper to consummate the transaction. If
the property is not so sold, or released and delivered up, the creditor shall not prove any part of his debt." From this section it is
clear that the assignee -who represents such creditors as prove their
claims against the estate of the bankrupt is invested with the right,
independent of the sanction of the court, to release to the secured
creditor the bankrupt's right of redemption, or to sell the property
subject to the claim of such creditor. If the creditor and the assignee cannot agree as to value of the property, or if the assignee
entertains doubts as to the validity of the creditor's debt, he may
by petition in the bankrupt proceedings have the property sold by
* the judgment of the court, or he may require the creditor to establish the validity of his debt. But if he and the general creditors
are satisfied that the debt is valid, and that the encumbered property is not of value more than sufficient to pay it, he may abandon
all claim to such property and leave it to be subjected by the creditor holding the lien. In such a case, to ask the Bankrupt Court
to assert its jurisdiction, and force the creditor to prove his claim,
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would not only not add anything to the amount to be distributed
among the unsecured creditors, but such a course might result in
reducing the dividends to which they would otherwise be entitled.
In re Melone, 3 Nat. B. Reg., it was held that it is no part of
the duty of the assignee to petition for the sale of encumbered
property, unless he shall believe that such a sale will create a
larger fund for distribution among the creditors generally than a
sale made by the sheriff of a state, or by the mortgagee.
rn re The Zron Mountain Conmpany of Lake chanplain, 4 N.
B. Reg. 645, Judge WOODRUFF says: "But where no advantage
can result to the estate of the bankrupt, I see no reason why the
court should interfere, when neither the assignee, nor any creditor,
invokes such interference, and it appears without contradiction that
the equity of redemption is of no value."
After further discussion, he proceeds: "Whether the property
when sold in foreclosure shall produce one-half or only one-fourth of
the amount of the mortgage, is not of the least moment. The
claimants of the lien, by electing to pursue the mortgaged premises,
will deprive themselves of any right to prove their debt in bankruptcy, for the deficiency, and in that view, it may be greatly for
the interest of the general creditors, to permit such election to be
carried into effect, and thereby enhance the dividends to be made
to them." There are numerous cases, in which upon the petition
of the assignee, or of a creditor, the bankrupt courts have enjoined
and restrained secured creditors from proceeding to enforce their
liens in the state courts, or from themselves selling the encumbered
property, and compelled them to submit their claims and their
securities to the jurisdiction of such courts, but we are apprised
of no instance in which this has been done, when the debt was
conceded to be valid, and the encumbered property was not of
sufficient value to satisfy it. When in the exercise of the discretion left to the assignee and the general creditors, by the Bankrupt Act, they voluntarily abandon all claim to encumbered property, then the state courts may subject such property to the
satisfaction of the creditor's claims and may afford him any relief
touching such property as he would have been entitled to, if the
proceedings in bankruptcy had never been instituted.
This court so held in the case of Payne & Bro. v. Abel, 7 Bush
344. It was so held by the Supreme Court of Vermont, in Stoddard v. Locke, 43 Verm. Rep. 574, and by the Supreme Court
of Maine in the case of Leighton v. Kelley, 4 Nat. B. Reg. 472.
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The jurisdiction of state courts to afford such relief, when the
secured creditors are not restrained from seeking it by the banktupt courts, is distinctly recognised by the United States District
Court for California, In re Davis, 4 Nat. B. Reg. 72.3, and by
Justice BRADLEY, of the Supreme Court, sitting as a Circuit Court,
in the case of Goddard v. Weaver, 6 Nat. B. Reg. 440. In said
case the bankrupt court was asked to set aside a sale of property
under a mortgage made by a sheriff in Louisiana. The assignee
failed to show that the act of the sheriff who was proceeding under
the state laws, would materially affect the interests of the general
creditors, and the judge held that the bankrupt court ought not to
interfere, saying in language at once expressive and forcible, "I
know of no authority which the assignee has to take property possessed by a bankrupt, except as bailee out of the sheriff's hand,
without paying the debt, or seeking the aid of courts sitting'in
bankruptcy; and if the sheriff proceeds to sell, I am unable to see
anything in the Bankrupt Act which renders void his acts, done
after the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy."
It seems perfectly manifest that the bankrupt courts are not invested by Congress with the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of a
bankrupt property, and that the assignee and general creditors may,
if they deem it to their interests, relinquish by non-action to a
secured creditor the title to property upon which he holds a lien,
and when they do so relinquish, the jurisdiction of the state courts
to perfect or enforce the title thus acquired cannot be questioned.
It is just this character of title or claim that the Vice-Chancellor
was called on to enforce in this case.
By the transfer of the certificate Scott passed to appellee at
least the beneficial ownership of the stock. The delivery of the
possession was as complete as the nature of the property pledged
or sold admitted of, and the only defect in appellee's muniment
of title 'was the non-transfer of the stock on the books of the
Louisville Bank. This non-transfer is the consequence of the
wrongful refusal by said bank when Rose, the attorney, applied to
make the transfer in 1868. It cannot therefore avail it anything
in this litigation.
Appellee's claims against Scott amounted, at the time of his discharge by the bankrupt court, to about $25,000-greatly more
than the value of the bank-stock he had pledged to secure their
payment.

BANK OF LOUISVILLE v. BANK OF NEWARK.

These claims are proved to be genuine and valid. The bankstock is bound for their payment.
Appellant, as a purchaser from the assignee in bankruptcy, is
entitled to the stock only upon condition that it will redeem it by
satisfying the debts for which it is pledged.
It has not appeared to do so, and therefore it lcannot complain
that the Vice-Chancellor has adjudged that it shall perfect and
tecognise appellee's title, and account to it for the dividends that
have accrued on the stock since it had notice of the transfer.
As appellant claims to be, and is, the holder of all the title to
the stock passed by the assignment to Scott's assignee, Scott and
his said assignee are only nominal parties to the action, and that was
no reason why the Vice-Chancellor should not proceed to judgment,
they being properly in court upon constructive service of process.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
The points of law stated in the foregoing opinion seem so well settled by
the decisions and so clear upon principle that we need scarcely stop to discuss
them. The rule in bankruptcy has been
long well settled that the mortgagee or
pledgee of anyportion of the bankrupt's
property, whether real or personal,
might elect to stand aloof from the proceedings in bankruptcy, unless the register elected to pay his debt and bring
the property into the proceedings, in
order to save the excess above the pledge
or mortgage for the general creditors,
or he may apply the value of his pledge
or mortgage upon the debt and then
prove for the balance of his debt, or he
may prove for his whole debt, first surrendering to the assignee the property
pledged or mortgaged. These rights
of the pledgee or mortgagee are subject
to certain qualifications under special provisions of the Bankrupt Act, which are
very clearly and very fully stated in the
opinion, which upon the whole scope of
the law embraced within its range affords
a valuable commentary, and cannot fail
to be of interest to the profession.
We have taken the liberty elsewhere,
(3 Wills 356 et seq.), to call in question
VOL. XXIII-37

the entire justice of the rule in bankruptcy restricting the right of the pledgee or mortgagee to prove for his whole
debt, irrespective of the amount secured
upon it. No doubt, during the life and
solvency of the debtor, the pledgee
or mortgagee may demand judgment
against him for the full amount of the
debt without applying the security, or in
any way impairing it. And it has
seemed to us that the mere decease of
the debtor and the settlement of his
estate in insolvency, ought not to impair the remedies of the creditor as they
existed before the decease. And in 3
Wills 358-360, and notes 19-21, we
have reviewed the authorities with the
view of maintaining, as far as practicable, the reasonableness of this view.
But it is apparent that the English rule,
both in bankruptcy and in equity, is that
which we have before stated, that the
pledgee or mortgagee must rely upon
his security, or else apply the amount
of it and then go against the general
estate for the balance, unless he elect to
surrender his security and prove his
whole debt against the estate. This
subject is discussed in Ex parte Sinith, 2
Rose 63, in bankruptcy, and in Green-
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wadl v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & My. 185
-Ihison v. Boqly. 2 My. & Cr. 443, 448,

referred to, and which prevails in Verniont andsome otlerstatesthat of allowing the creditor whoqe debt is partially
in equity. See also Barker v. ,;nark,
3 Bcav. 64. There are many other
setcmred to prove his whole debt and
ca~es in equity passing upon tlue general
take a dividend thereon, and then hold
quc-ion, whIich we have cited 3 Wills
his security for the balance: Duncan v.
358. n. 17, 21), but as there i. no controF7,h1
.. , 1 Aikens 231 ; l1alcer v.
versy in rerard to the rule in bankruptcy
Barker, 26 Vt. 718; Jutnan v. Ruswe aI-tain fron flurthler comnlent. WYe sell, 17 Id 54. There is certainlygreat
ont,t. perhap, to say that. upon fur- plausibility, and perhaps justice, in rether reflection, we are more disposed to
garding the debt as entirely cancelled
quetion the equity of the rule for which
to the extent of the security.
we contend in our work on Wills before
I. F. R.

S'ulreme Court of Illinois.
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. v. THOMAS GODFREY.
If the track of a railroad he used by persons for their own purposes, no right of
way over its ground as a public thoroughfare for iieople to walk upon will be
acquired, increly becau-e the company do not see fit to enforce its right anti put
people off it- premises. Neither will the company be bound to protect or provide
safe,_,uards for per.ons so uin, its grounds for their own convenience.
Where the plaintifl is himself in tile wrong, or not in the exercise of a legal

right, or i6 at the time enjoying a privilege or favor granted without compensation
or ,cnclit to the party granting it, and of whose carelessness complaint is made,
he. tie plaintiff, must use extraordinary care before he can complain of the negligence of another.

As a general rule it is culpable negligence to cross the track of a railroad at a
highway-crossing without looking in every direction that the rails run to ascertain
whether a train is approaching.
APPEAL from Macon county.
The facts sufficiently appear in
the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-This cause was tried in the court below and submitted to the jury as manifested by the instructions given and
refused, upon an erroneous theory, which was, that from the fact of
the citizens of Decatur having been in the habit of passing and
repassing over the portion of defendants' right of way where the
injury in question occurred, the plaintiff had acquired some right
which affected the defendant's situation toward him, and that at
the time of the accident, he was in the exercise of a legal right.
It very materially affects the question of the respective duties and
liabilities of the parties, whether at such time the plaintiff was in
the exercise of a legal right or not.
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The right of way was the exclusive property of the company,
upon which no unauthorized person had a right to be for any purpose. The plaintiff was travelling upon defendant's right of way,
not for any purpose of business connected with the railroad but
for his own mere convenience as a footway, in reaching his home
or on return from a search after his cow. There was nothing to
exempt him from the character of a wrongdoer and trespasser in
so doing, further than the supposed implied assent of the company,
hrising from their non-interference with a previous like practice by
other individuals.
But because the company did not see fit to enforce its right and
put people off its premises, no right of way over its ground was
thereby acquired. It was not bound to protect or provide safeguards for persons so using its grounds for their own convenience.
The place was one of danger, and such persons went there at their
own risk, and enjoyed the supposed implied license, subject to its
attendant perils.
At the most there was here no more than a mere passive acquiescence in this use. A mere iiaked license or permission to enter
or pass over an estate will not create a duty or impose an obligation
on the part of the owner to provide against the danger of accident :

Sweeney v. Old Colony & Newport B. Co., 10 Allen 373; .Eickey
v. Boston &Lowell B. Co., 14 Id. 429 ; Phil. & B. B. Co. v.
Hamell,44 Penn. St. 375; Gillis v. The Penn. B. Co., 59 Id.
129.
For all the purposes of this suit, the plaintiff stands in no more
favorable condition than that of a wrongdoer and trespasser. He
was not at the time of the accident in the exercise of a legal right,
and was in the enjoyment of no more than a bare license, or assent
tacitly given, and his duty or the obligation of the company are to
be measured as in the case of one thus situated. Where both parties are equally in the position of right which they hold independent of the favor of each other, the plaintiff is only bound to show
that the injury-was produced by the negligence of the defendant,
and that he exercised ordinary care or diligence in endeavoring to
avoid it. But where the plaintiff is himself in the wrong, or not
in the exercise of a legal right, or was at the time enjoying a privilege or favor granted without compensation or benefit to the party
granting it, and of whose carelessness complaint is made, he the
plaintiff must use extraordinary care before he can complain of
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the negligence of another: Tie Aurora Branch R. Co. v. Grines,
13 Ill. 585. As a general rule, it is culpable negligence to cross
the track of a railroad at a highway crossing without looking every
direction that the rails run, to ascertain whether a train is approaching; Shearm. & I edf. on Negligence, see. 488 and cases cited in
note; and the same degree of care and precaution of course would;
be required on the part of one travelling laterally upon the track.
With increased force did this argument apply to this plaintiff,
who was not lawfully using the railroad track. He only says that
when he went on the road, lie looked and saw no engine. But
this was not enough. Ile should have kept constant watch while
he was travelling along the track for the approach of an engine.
Besides there was ample space between the tracks for plaintiff to
have walked without exposure to danger on either track, and there
would seem to have been an omission of due care in not so walking
in the place where lie was, as not to place himself needlessly
within distance of the engine.
The negligence of defendant alleged in, the declaration is in not
ringing a bell or blowing a whistle before the engine crossed the
railroad crossing and in not slackening speed as it approached and
passed on the crossing and in running at a great rate of speed, and
it is further insisted on in argument as negligence that there was
no fireman employed on the engine, and that those in charge of the
engine had their attention directed to the train on the other road
near the crossing, instead of forward along the track.
But the defendant under the circumstances of the case is clearly
chargeable for no such negligence as this. It is only for wanton
or wilful injury that the defendant is here chargeable or such gross
negligence as evidences wilfulness. Notwithstanding the plaintiff
was unlawfully upon defendant's right of way or not in the exercise
of a legal right, and that his own lack of ordinary care exposed
him to the risk of injury, yet the defendant might not with impunity wantonly or wilfully injure him. And if defendant's servants
who were in the management of the engine after becoming aware
of plaintiff's danger failed to use ordinary care to avoid inijuring
him, defendant might be liable. And this as we conceive is the
only measure of liability to be claimed under the facts of this case,
laying out of view any breach of the ordinance which will be hereafter referred to: The Aurora Branch R. (Jo. v. Grimes supra;
Cal. d Chi. B. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478; St. L., A. J-T. H. B.
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Co. v. Todd, 36 Ill. 409; Chi. & Alton 1h. B. Co. v. Gretzner, 46 Ill. 74; Shearm & Redf. on Negligence, secs. 25-36; 1
Redf. Law of Railways 464-568; The Tonowanda B1. 1B. Co. v.
Munger, 5 Denio 255; Phil.& R. B. B. v. Hummell and Gillis v.
The Penn. B. B. Co., supra.
The principle embodied in defendant's refused instructions is in
conformity with the views here expressed; and as applied to the
facts of this case we regard them as substantially correct, and that
they should have been given.
The second instruction given for the plaintiff, and the 6th and 7th,
are liable to the same objection ; they are erroneous in intimating
that the use of defendant's road by citizens to walk back and forth
upon without hindrance or objection by defendants constituted the
same a public thoroughfare for people to walk upon.
The company did not in any sense hold forth an invitation to
the public to use this track for foot travel. The railroad company
owned the right of way and had a clear right to a free track, which
they had not yielded up or modified by any act of their own, and
the jury should not have been misled by the instruction to think
otherwise, as they well might have been.
The omission to notice other instructions given for the plaintiff
is not to be understood as an implied sanction of them. In so far
as they may run contra to the views here announced, they must be
deemed erroneous.
What has been said is without reference to the question of the
rate of speed of the engine being greater than that prescribed by
the ordinance of Decatur introduced in evidence. The declaration
contains no allegation that there was a city ordinance regulating
the speed of trains, and objection was made to the introduction of
the ordinance in evidence because the defendant had not been
charged with a breach of the ordinance.
In Ill. Central. R. B. Co. v. McKee, 48 Ill. 119, the negligence charged in the declaration was in not maintaining and keeping
in repair a fence; and it was held that testimony was inadmissible that a gate on the line of the fence had been left open, because
there was no allegation of negligence in that respect, to give notice
to the defendant of what he was to defend against.
Under the authority of that case we think the ordinance should
have been excluded. Besides, the testimony as to the rate of speed
being in excess of that prescribed by the ordinance was conflicting,
R.
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which rendered it important that thejury should have been correctly
What effect running at a rate of

instructed in other respects.

speed prohibited by the ordinance might have upon the rights of
the parties, we are to be understood as expressing no opinion in regard to that. The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.
It may be regarded as the settled doetrine that it is negligence for a person
to cross a railroad at a highway-crossing without taking such ohrervation as
will make it sure that the road is clear:
Ste s v. Oswego,.j Syr'acuse R. R. Co., 18
N. Y. 422 ; Dascomb v. Bof. &" St. Line
v. .
1R. R. Co., 27 Barb. 221 ;e'keg
Y. Cent. R. R. Co., Id. 528 ; Bieseiqel
v. N. 1. Cent. R R. Co., 40 N. Y. 9
Xirth Penn. R. R. Co. v. Ilfleman, 49

]'enn. St. 460; Huoorer R. R. Co. v.
GOqle, 55 Id. 396 ; Shaw v. Boston

&"

aW1orcester R. R. Co., 8 Gray 73 ; WIt
renv. Fitchburq R. R. Co., 8 Allen 227;

Butterfield v. I fletern R. R. (o., 10 Id.
532; Toledo 6. liWabash Ry. Co v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185; .J. C. R". R. Co. v.
Buckner, 28 Ills. 299 ; Carrollv. Minn.
Kdleyl R. R. Co., 13 Minn. 30; Rothe v.
31ilwaukee 4- St. Paul R. R. Co., 21
Wisconsin 256 ; Stabley v. London 6North Western Ry. Co., Law Rep. 1
Exeh. 13.
But the distinction taken in the principal case as to whether the party complaining had a right to be where the injury happened, or was induced to go
there by the action of the party whose
negligence is complained of, has not
always been observed.
This case rightly decides, we think,
that the right of way of a railroad is the
exclusive property and under the exclusive control of the company, and if persons use it without permih.ssion, or even
with the tacit assent of the company,
they do it at their peril, and the company
will not be liable in the absence of gross
negligence or wilful injury.

The necessity of the party complaining to have some right to be where the
injury happened was early adjudged.
Thus in Blgth v. 7To1hain, Cro. Jac.
158, it was held, if A. seised of a wate
adjacent to a highway digs a pit within

thirty-.ix feet of the highway, and the
mare of B. escapes into the waste ani
falls into the pit and (lies there, yet B.
shall not have an action against A., because the making of the pit in the waste,
and not in the highway, was not any
wrong to B., but it was the default of
B. hinmself that his mare escaped into
the waste.
So in Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunton
522, it is said : " If I place a log across
a public path and injury be thereby sustained, the soil being my own, but the
public or individuals having a right
over it, an action will lie because there
is a right in others to pass along without interruption ; but if there be no
right of way, I may, with any view, and
for any purpose, place logs on my own
land, and a party having no right to he
there, and sustaining damage by his own
trespass, cannot bring an action for the
In iiounsell v.
damage so sustained.'
Smyth, 7 Common Bench N. S. 731, the
allegation was "that aIll persons having
occasion to pass over the waste had heen
used ant accustomed to go upon and
across the same without interruption or
hindrance from and with the license and
permission of the owners of the waste.'
Hield, that this showed no right in the
plaintiff to be there.
A mere permission does not create a
right to do a negligent act : Hickey v.
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Boston 6- Lowell R. R. Co., 14 Allen party although a technical trespasser
429.
may recover; but for the most part
There must be some inducement held
these are like B. R. Co. v. Stout, 17
Out by the party whose negligence is Wallace 657, where the lilaintiff was
:omplained of. In addition to Sweeny too young to be able to take much care
v. Old Colony 4- Newport R. R. Co.,
of himself; or like Bird v. Holbrook,
boticed in the principal case, may be 4 Bing. 628, where the setting of the
cited upon this point Hovi*ell v. &nyth,
spring-gun without notice, and for the
supra; Binks v. South Yorkshire Ry. express purpose of doing an injury, was
Co., 32 Law Journal N. S. 26; Carby held to be an inhuman and unjustifiable
v. Hill, 93 Eng. Com. Law 556; Hard- act; or they are cases where the neglicastle v. South Yorkshire Ry. Co., 4 gence of the party complained of has
Hurl. & Nor. 67.
been either gross or wilful.
There are cases which hold that a
C. H. W.

Court of A ppea8 of New York.
ADRIANCE v. LAGRAVE.
The surrender of fugitives from justice by one government to another, is not a
duty or obligation imposed by the law of nations but is dependent on comity.
The creditors of an absconding debtor instituted proceedings by which he was
criminally indicted in the state of New York, and upon demand of the United
States government extradited from France where he had taken refuge and brought
to New York, and was there arrested in civil actions brought in the state courts
by creditors who had procured his extradition : Held, that such orders of arrest
must be set aside.
But where the debtor was arrested at the suit of a creditor who had taken no
part in the extradition proceedings, Held, that the arrest was valid.

APPEAL from an order of the General Term of the Supreme
Court reversing an order of the Special Term of that court, denying a motion to set aside the service of the summons and complaint, and to vacate an order of arrest which had been granted.
The facts of the case were that the defendant Alfred E. Lagrave,
who was in the early part of 1872 a dry goods dealer in New York
city, after having made large purchases of goods from leading
importers, did on Sunday, June 26th 1872, secretly abscond
without paying or providing for his debts. Certain of his creditors
upon this joined together for the purpose of bringing him to justice,'and proceedings were thereupon taken which resulted in an
indictment being found against him for burglary in the third
degree under the New York statute (2 R. S. 669, § 17), and upon
demand of the United States government he was delivered up by-
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the government of France, where he had taken refuge, and brought
to New York for the ostensible purpose of being tried under the
indictment. Upon his arrival here, however, orders of arrest in the
civil actions brought by his various creditors were served upon
him and he was held under them.
Upon motion, however, these orders of arrest were set aside
where they had been obtained by creditors who had joined in procuring tile defendant's extradition (Lagrave's Case, 14 Abb. Pr.
N. S. 333, note), but were sustained in the case of the plaintiffs in
the suit, and others who had taken no part in the proceedings used
to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court: Adriance v. Lagrave, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 272.
Upon appeal, however, the General Term of the Supreme Court
reversed the decision at Special Term in this case and vacated the
order ofarrest which had been granted, and thereupon the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.
D. .1. Porter, for appellants, in addition to the eases referred
to in the opinion, cited on the point that a government might deliver up a fugitive from justice although there were no treaty, cited
Bast India L'onmjny v. Campbell, I Vesey Sen. 246; )flatter of
Clark, 9 Wend. 211 ; Washburne's Case, 4 Johns. Ch. 106, cited
in Clark's Law of Extradition, pp. 30, 51; Vattel, b. 2, ch. 6,
§ 76; lleineecius, Prelec. in h. t., Grotius, b. 2, c. 21, §§ 3, 4, 5;
Martin's Summary of the Law of Nations, p. 107 ; Story on the
Conlst., § 1803.
Charles TIf. Brooke, counsel for the defendant, appeared for the
purposes of the motion only, and argued that the crime of burglary in the third degree under the New York statute, was not a
crime for which the defendant could be extradited under the treaty
with France, and that the defendant had been brought here unlawfully and had never become subject to the jurisdiction of the
New York courts.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHuicH, C. J.-The question whether an extradited

person

can be detained by arrest upon civil process has not been, that I
am aware, adjudged.
The learned judge at General Term, in an able opinion in favor
of setting aside the order of arrest, maintained that there was an
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implied treaty obligation binding upon and enforceable by the
courts, not to detain the accused for any act, criminal or civil, committed prior to the extradition, except the crime specified in the
proceedings. He cited no authorities, but enforced his position by
plausible and forcible arguments. I have examined the subject
with some care, with a view if possible to arrive at the same result,
which I regard as eminently just as a principle, but the examination has created doubts of the legal soundness of the position.
. It was formerly very much questioned among jurists, whether
the surrender of fugitives from justice by one government to another
was a duty or obligation imposed by the law of nations, or depended
upon courtesy or comity which might be or might not be exercised at the pleasure of each government without cause of complaint. , In this country and in England at least it has been sub•stantially settled that no -such duty exists, and in practice it is
b6lieved that in nearly all countries, neither demand nor surrender
in now made except in obedience to treaty stipulations: Kent's
Com. 38, note d., 11th ed. and cases cited; Story's Conflict of
Laws, § 626 and cases cited; 2 Story on Constitution, § 1808.
The defendant Lagrave was in fact delivered up under proceedings in pursuance of a treaty between the United States and
France concluded in 1843, and amended in 1845, by which each
government agreed "to deliver up to justice," persons accused of
certain specified crimes, among which is burglary, "defining the
same to be breaking and entering by night into the mansion-house
of another with intent to commit felony." The indictment was
for burglary in the third degree under our statute, and clearly not
within the treaty, but it is not for the defendant to raise this question. The government of France had power to surrender him for
any offence, and even if deceived and defrauded the defendant cannot interpose in its behalf. The question of good faith is for the
two governments.
It has been decided, in other actions in favor of parties who were
held to have been concerned in procuring the defendant to be
brought within the jurisdiction of the court, by the extradition
proceedings, in bad faith, for the purpose of arresting him on civil
process, that he should be discharged from arrest on the ground
that such persons should not receive an advantage through their
wrongful acts: 14 Abb. N. S. 333, note. But this rule does not
apply to persons not concerned in the trick or device tiy which the
VOL. XXI.-,38
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party was brought within the jurisdiction of the court: Id. and
cases cited.
The other point, as to the legal right to detain the defendant for
any purpose except the prosecution of the particular offence for
which he was given up, presents a different question, and is the one
passed upon in the negative in the court below.
In the Caldwell Case, 8 Blatch. C. C. 131, the prisoner was
indicted for bribing an officer of the United States, and pleaded
that he was a resident of Prescott, in the Province of Ontario, and
Dominion of Canada, and was arrested and brought here under extradition proceedings, in pursuance of the Ashburton treaty, for
forgery, to which there was a demurrer on behalf of the government. BENEDICT, J., in delivering the opinion, overruling the demurrer, held, that the prisoner could not raise the point of good
faith of the extradition, as that was a question between the two
governments, which the courts could not'investigate; and upon the
other point he added, " And I cannot say that the fact that the defendant was brought within the jurisdiction by virtue of a warrant
of extradition for the crime of forgery affords him any legal exemption from prosecution for other crimes by him committed."
Mr. Clarke, in his work on Extradition, has collected a number
of cases bearing upon the point. During the late civil war, one
Burley was demanded by the United States from Canada, upon a
charge of robbery committed on board the steamer "Philo Parsons
on Lake Erie."
ie claimed before the Canadian authorities that
the act was belligerent in the service of the Confederate States.
As he failed to show any commission or authority for doing the
act, but only an adoption of the act after it was done, he was surrendered, and upon a trial in Ohio the jury disagreed, and he was
finally discharged. The case attracted attention in England upon
the suggestion that it was contemplated to put the prisoner on
trial for piracy, and the law officers were inquired of as to its
legality. They held that if the United States put him bond fide
on his trial for the offence in respect to which he was given up, it
would be difficult to question their right to try him for any other
offence, whether within the treaty or not. One answer was: "We
admit in this country that if a man is bondfide tried for the offence
for which he was given up, there is nothing to prevent his being
subsequently tried for another offence either antecedently committed or not." It is quite evident that the question was regarded
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as one of good faith, as the legal obligation claimed in this case
could not depend upon whether the prisoner was tried for the particular offence or not: Clarke on Ex. 90 note.
In France the question has frequently been considered by the
courts, whose decisions have not been entirely uniform. In one
case the decree recited that it was a matter of principle that an
accused person should only be tried for the offence for which he
was surrendered, except with his express consent: Id. 169. Subsequently the Minister of Justice intervened and insisted that the
courts could not interfere, and had no concern with questions relating to extradition, and that if the question was raised they could
only suspend proceedings until the government should decide. He
said that "a criminal could acquire no right against the justice of
his country. The tribunal had nothing to do but to try the facts, it
could not take cognisance of the conditions upon which extradition
had been granted, except upon a notification from the Minister of
Justice."
The Court of Cassation finally adopted these views, and they may
be regarded as the settled practice of the French courts: Id. 172.
These authorities indicate at least the views entertained in this
country, England and France, which are,. as far as they go, against
the position claimed. In none of them is there an allusion to any
treaty obligation. If such a provision had been inserted in the
treaty, it would of course have secured to the defendant a legal
right of immunity from detention for other purposes. A treaty is
a contract, and is to be construed upon principles similar to those
applied to other contracts. Anything necessarily implied is as
though inserted ; but can it be said that there is such an implication of an agreement on the part of the United States that the
prisoner shall not be detained for any other lawful purpose ? It
may be conceded that such a provision would be wise and proper,
but can it be regarded as in the treaty P I can find no authority
warranting such a conclusion ; on the contrary, the cases are quite
uniform against it. The English Parliament has since passed- an
act to meet the difficulty: 33 and 34 Viet. ch. 52. It is designated "The Extradition Act of 1870 ;" and provides that a fugitive
criminal shall not be delivered up unless by the law of the foreign
country, or by arrangement, he cannot be tried for any but the extradited offence until he has an opportunity of returning to that
country, and the same provision of immunity from prosecution is
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secured in favor of fugitives delivered to that country. These
provisions would have been unnecessary if there existed any such
implied obligation as is claimed in this case. While we appreciate
the justice and fairness in the abstract of the principle adjudged
in the court below, in view of the authorities referred to, and in
the absence of any legal principle upon which it 'can rest, we do
not feel justified in holding that there is such an implied obligation
which can be enforced by the courts at the instance of the defendant as will prevent a prosecution for other offences, or civil liabilities.
The right of exemption from prosecution, if it can be said to
exist at all, is based upon the good faith of the government, which
is necessarily uncertain, and is a political and not a judicial question. , Congress doubtless has power to pass an act similar to the
English act referred to, as the whole subject of extradition is confided to the Federal Government. It has exercised this power by
passing an act to protect fugitive criminals from lawless violence:
15 U. S. Stat. at Large 837, sec. 1. That these provisions ought
to be extended to protection from other prosecutions or detentions
I do not doubt, but until this is done by the law-making power, by
treaty or statute, we feel constrained to hold that the courts cannot
interfere.
- As the present plaintiffs were not concerned in the alleged fraud
of procuring the defendant to be brought within the jurisdiction of
the state, we can see no ground for setting aside the order of
arrest.
The order of the General Term must be reversed and that of the
Special Term affirmed.
All concur, except

GROVER

and

FOLGER,

United States Circuit Coirt.

JJ., dissenting.

D-istrict of

Virginia.

THE STEAMER OLER.
The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts extends to a tort, committed by collision on an artificial ship canal connecting navigable waters which
are within that jurisdiction.
Where by a collision one vessel is left helpless in the track of navigation, and
on the following day is injured by a passing vessel, the vessel in fault in the original collision is liable for the cost of repairing the injuries received by the disabled
vessel in the second collision.

THE STEAMER OLER.
LIBEL in admiralty. The facts were that on November 27th
1872, the schooner Annie Cole, John Q. Hozier (the libellant)
master, being in North river, North Carolina, near the month,
laden with fresh fish for Norfolk, fell in with the steamer W. G.
Oler, John E. Wyatt, master, also bound for Norfolk, and signalled
the steamer for a tow. The Oler slacked her speed, threw her line,
which was caught by the schooner; and the two vessels proceeded
uii the North river, and into the " Virginia cut" of the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, until they had got within two miles
of the northern terminus. This was late in the day; and the
steamer grounded; some say on 'the starboard (east) some on the
port (west) side of the canal. When the steamer grounded they
were moving at less than two miles an hour. The tow-rope was
some two hundred feet long. As soon as the steamer grounded,
the master of the Annie Cole turned her bow to the starboard
bank of the canal, and ran it aground within twenty-five yards of
the place where the steamer struck. The steamer, which was a
stern-wheel propeller; soon reversed her wheel; thereby loosed
herself; and commenced moving back towards the schooner. The
master of the latter and his mate shouted vehemently to the
steamer to stop backing, lest she should strike and sink the schooner.
Three men in the schooner took poles and set them against the
steamer to prevent collision, but they broke. For some reason
the steamer continued to back. On nearing the schooner the
action of her wheel had caused a "suck," which loosed the
schooner from the bank. The schooner was then drawn under
the steamer, where the wheel of the latter soon struck her, knocking a hole in her below the water-line so large that the schooner
soon sank. The value of the cargo would have been at Norfolk
from $950 to $1800. Energetic efforts were made to save it, but
without success ; and it proved a total loss. The steamer went
on to Norfolk; the schooner remained sunk on the side of the
canal in a careened position. The next day another vessel in
passing struck the mast and other parts of the schooner, still
further damaging her. The cost of repairs to the schooner and
of raising her was $581. The libel was for damages to the vessel
and the cargo, both exceeding $1500.
The respondents resisted the claim on several grounds, viz.:1st. They claimed that the towing was gratuitous, and not for
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hire, and that there was no implied contract on the part of the
master of the tug to sustain th- risk of such an accident as happened.
2d. They denied that the accident was the result of negligence
on the steamer's part, but insisted that it happened by the want
of judgment and skill in the master of the schooner.
3d. They clailned that even if the steamer were responsible for
the collision and direct damages, she was not responsible for the
damages inflicted upon the schooner on the next day by another
vessel.
4th. They objected that the libel was in form for breach of contract, and in fact for tort, and therefore demurrable.
5th. They denied that tort committed on a canal is cognisable
in an admiralty court.
Good and (Taplain, for libellant.
.Ellis &. Welborn, for the steamer.
HUGHES, J.-The first two objections are clearly untenable,
from the evidence. The tug had towed the schooner on a former
occasion for hire; and there was, independently of that fact,
enough in this transaction to imply a contract for hire. It cannot
be questioned that the backing of the tug for the distance of twenty
yards upon the schooner, which caused the collision, was by the
fault of those upon the tug, Her master was bound to the observance of care and diligence, and the facts prove upon him carelessness and positive blame.
The third objection cannot be sustained. The collision left the
schooner helpless in the canal, liable 'to continual injury from
passing vessels and otherwise. For such injuries as she was liable
to sustain while in that condition, the tug was responsible. She
is therefore liable for the cost of repairs for the injury which the
schooner did actually sustain on the day after the collision. This
is a much stronger case than that of the Narragansett,1 Blatchf.
211, where the court gave costs resulting from damage happening
in consequence of the collision, from the injured vessel upsetting.
before she was got into port.
The fourth objection merely goes to the form of the libel, and
not to the substance. The objection is such as can be cured by
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amendment at any time before decree, and leave is given to make
this amendment. This libel is in fact for tort, and the only informality consists in its using the phrase "in a cause of contract"
when it ought to have said -1in a cause of collision," in its opening
statement of the cause of action. A like objection was overruled
in the case of the Quickstep, 9 Wall. 665, where it was decided
that the recital of a contract for towage in a libel for collision
does not necessarily convert the libel into a proceeding on the contract. In truth, there was cause of action, both for breach of
contract of bailment, and for collision ; and both causes of action
might have been joined in the libel.
Coming, therefore, to the fifth objection, and that on which
counsel for defence laid chief stress in the argument, I am called
upon to decide whether the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts of
the United States extends to a tort committed on a canal, connecting two navigable rivers affected by the tides. The "Virginia
cut" of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal has capacity to pass
a vessel of a thousand tons; and for an aggregate tonnage of fifty
millions a year. An annual commerce of 400,000 tons passes
through it. The number of vessels, masted and otherwise, traversing it per annum, is now about 6000. It has but one lock,
which is 220 feet long and 40 feet broad, and this is a tidewater
lock. It connects the waters of the Elizabeth and North rivers,
of Hampton Roads and Albemarle Sound; and is part of an
inside chain of navigation parallel to the coast, extending from New
York to Florida. It is a part of the great system of navigable
waters of the Atlantic seaboard of the United States ; and the
magnitude and character of its commerce are such as undoubtedly
place it within the admiralty jurisdiction, if it is not withdrawn
therefrom, by the fact that it is an artificially constructed work,
open to the public, but owned by a private corporation.
Judicial opinion as to the admiralty jurisdiction, has been quite
progressive in this country. At first, the narrow view of the old
English common-law judges obtained in our courts; and it was
held that the admiralty jurisdiction with us extended only to tidewaters, and to rivers navigable from the sea as far as they were
affected by the tides. Such was the tenor of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of the Thomas Jefferson,
rendered in 1825; see 10 Wheat. 428. The position thus taken, was
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held for twenty-six years by that court. The vast commerce of
the Mississippi river and its tributaries, as well as" of the great
lakes and their connecting waters, was thus deprived of.the benefit
of the system of admiralty jurisdiction which had grown with the
growth and accommodated itself to the wants of the commerce of
the world for centuries. Some relief from this decision was found
necessary. The position .taken by the Supreme Court in the
Thomas Jefferson, compelled a resort to some legislative provision
for the commerce of the great lakes and rivers; and, accordingly,
Congress by the Act of February 26th 1845, gave a jurisdiction
in the nature of admiralty jurisdiction, to the District Courts of
the United States, "in all matters of contract and tort," upon
vessels of twenty tons, &c., arising upon the lakes and the waters
connecting them. Under this act, the courts of the United States
took cognisance of the class of causes it names, arising in those
waters, for some six years. In such causes, they did not act as
admiralty courts; they did not administer an admiralty jurisdiction;
they acted under statutory authority as quasi admiralty courts ;
and administered a statutory jurisdiction in the nature of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
By 1851, the Supreme Court bad arrived at a different opinion
-of the proper jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts of the United
States, from that which it held in the case of the Thomas Jefferson in 1825. Commencing in that year with the case of the Genesee Ohief, a case of collision occurring on Lake Ontario, in a
chain of decisions reaching down to the -Eagle, decided in 1868,
and reported in 8 Wallace, it has assumed positions more and
more advanced on this subject, until it has come to hold that the
Act of 1845 conferred no powers upon the District Courts of the
United States which they did not already have as admiralty courts ;
and that their jurisdiction as admiralty courts not only extends
over the ocean, and its bays and harbors, its gulfs and tidal waters,
but to the inland lakes and their connecting waters; and to the
interior rivers of the country to the extent of their navigable capacity, holding that the navigability of .waters, open and public,
brings them within the admiralty jurisdiction, and not the circumstance of their being affected by the tides, or of their emptying
into or opening from tidewaters. I have examined these decisions
carefully, and I nowhere find that the Supreme Court, in defining
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the waters over which the admiralty jurisdiction of the District
Courts extends, uses any discrimination between natural public
waters and artificial public waters. Chief Justice TANE-, in the
Genesee Chief, employed language which has been substantially
adopted in all recent decisions of that tribunal. He said: "There
can be no reason for admiralty power over a public tidewater,
which does not apply with equal force to any other public waters
used for commercial purposes and foreign trade," using the word
public in the sense of open to the public.
I know of but one case that has come before our courts in which
this question whether the admiralty jurisdiction extends to a canal
has occurred. That was the case of the Young America, reported
in Newberry, page 101, in which there was a collision on the Welland Canal, which is on British territory. Judge WILKINS held
that the court had jurisdiction, even under the Act of 1845, which
must be confessed to be a far weaker source of authority in admiralty causes arising in a foreign country, than the admiralty and
maritime law itself, and the jurisdiction it confers.
Another canal case was that of the -Diana,decided in England
and reported in Lushington, which was quoted appyovingly by our
Supreme Court in The -Eagle,8 Wall. I have not been able to
consult th6 report of that case, but it was one of collision on the
Great Holland Canal in 1862. The objection there raised to the
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court was not that the water on
which the collision occurred was an artificial canal, but was the old
English objection that the canal was not a tidal water. The objection was overruled by Dr. LUSHINGTON, and the jurisdiction of
the English admiralty over an inland canal in a foreign country
was maintained. Acting in the spirit of the United States Supreme Court in all its decisions, from that of the Genesee Chief
down to the present time, and upon the two precedents of canal
cases which I have cited from Newberry on this side of the Atlantic, and Lushington on the other, I have no hesitation in deciding
that causes of contract and tort arising in the .Virginia part of the
Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal, otherwise cognisable in admiralty,
are within the admiralty jurisdiction of this court.
A decree may be taken for the libellants for $531.95, the cost
of repairs to the vessel, and for $1050, the amount of loss sustained on the fish, and costs.
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Supreme Court of Missouri.
GEORGE POMEROY v. WILLIAM II. BENTON.
A partner is a trustee, and the same rules and tests are to be applied in determining his liability to his copartners as are applied to other trustees.
If a partner secretly uses the partnership funds in outside operations, the profits
are the property of the firm, and. the latter are entitled to an account and payment.
Where a party is in a position of trust and confidence, and therefore under obligation to disclose all material facts, his representations of facts as true without an
examination whether the statement contains the whole truth, is as much a breach
of trust as a 4ilful falsehood. In such a case equity treats omission as a fraud in

itself.
A bill of sale, although broad enough in its terms, does not include property
not in the knowledge or contemplation of the vendor, and under the MIissouri
practice a bill in equity will lie for an account of such property without asking a

'formal rescission of the bill of sale.
THIS was a suit in the nature of a bill in equity. The plaintiff
and defendant were for a number of years copartners under the
name and style of Pomeroy & Benton, engaged in the wholesale
dry goods business, in the city of St. Louis, where the defendant
resided and managed the business of the firm, while the plaintiff
resided in the city of New York, attended to the affairs of the firm
at that point and seldom visited St. Louis. The petition in substance charges that defendant, in violation of the articles of copartnership and of his duty as partner, and without the knowledge
or consent of plaintiff, used the money, credits and assets of the
firm in the purchase of government vouchers and whiskey, and in
various other ways misappropriated the money, credits and property of the firm, whereby he realized immense profits; that he
fraudulently omitted to charge any of these matters on the partnership books; that subsequently he forwarded to plaintiff a false
balance-sheet purporting to be a correct exhibit of the whole partnership affairs, but it in fact did not mention any of the speculations in which defendant had been .engaged or of the profits he had
realized; that this balance-sheet defendant, though knowing the
contrary, assured plaintiff was correct; that by these representations and other fraudulent conduct and contrivances, defendant induced the plaintiff, who relied solely on the defendant and his
representations, to settle with him on the basis of the balancesheet, and to sell out to him his entire interest in the firm for
$275,000, a sum far below its real worth. The petitioner concludes with a prayer for opening the settlement and taking an
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account as to the matter complained of, and for general relief.
All the material allegations of the petition were denied by the
answer, which also set up as new matter of defence, that defendant
had purchased of plaintiff his entire interest in the firms of Pomeroy & Benton, Pomeroy, Benton & Co., Pomeroy, Durkee & Co.,
and Pomeroy & Durkee, for the sum of $275,000, and received a
bill of sale therefor, whereby the firm of Pomeroy & Benton was
dissolved and the entire interest of plaintiff in the goods, property
and assets of that firm were conveyed or assigned to defendant, on
the 1st day of January 1865, and that plaintiff from that time forward had no further interest, right or claim in the firm of Pomeroy & Benton or the other firms mentioned, and that plaintiff was
thereby barred of having the relief prayed for.
Glover & Shepley, Sharp & Broadheadand Samuel Knox, for
plaintiff.
Cline, Jamison & Day and J.

. Krum, for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHIERWOOD, J.-Laying aside for the present all inquiry as to
the sufficiency of the petition and the effect to be given to the defendant's answer, what the evidence in the cause establishes will
be briefly adverted to, and the questions of any practical importance necessarily arising therefrom stated and discussed.
These questions are two, viz.: First, did the defendant appropriate the credits or funds of the firm to his own private use in the
purchase of government vouchers and whiskey? Second, was such
appropriation made without the consent and in fraud of the rights
of the plaintiff?
I am forced to the conclusion, after a careful perusal of the
evidence, that both these questions must receive a reply in the
affirmative, as it is abundantly established by the testimony that
the defendant, prior to the dissolution of the firm, in contravention
of the articles of copartnership and of his duty as partner, appropriated its moneys and credits to his own private use in the purchase of vouchers and high wines, for which he never accounted,
but on the contrary induced the plaintiff to execute to him a bill
of sale sufficiently comprehensive inform to embrace the former's
entire interest in the firm; whereas the balance-sheet, which was
used as the basis on which the sale was effected, made no mention of,
and contained not the most distant allusion to the profits fraudu-
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lently realized by the defendant, and of which, as shown by the
testimony, plaintiff was entirely unaware, reposing as he did in
defendant and his representations the most implicit confidence.
It is no excuse for, nor does it lie in the mouth of the defendant
to aver, that plaintiff might have discovered the wrong and prevented its accomplishment had he exercised watchfulness, because
this is but equivalent to saying: "You trusted me, therefore I had
the right to betray you." The maxim Vigilantibus et non dormientibus equitas subveniet is without application here; it only
-applies where a party being apprised of, slumbers upon his rights.
For the betrayal of confidence reposed, the skilful lulling to rest
of the intended victim, the adroit closing of every avenue through
which apprehension might enter-whether this be done by words
.or by "expressive silence," are the ear-marks of successful fraud
the world over. And a court of equity, should it make such a perverse application of one of its fundamental maxims as that seeningly insisted on by defendant's counsel, would become the efficient
ally of the vigilant wrongdoer, prove recreant to its past history
and the principles on which its very jurisdiction rests.
That the balance-sheet was the basis of the estimate of plaintiff's interest in the concern is sufficiently clear, proven as it is by
the testimony of plaintiff as well as by defendant's admissions to
Wilkerson. It is equally clear that the voucher and whiskey
transactions were not included in such estimate. These things
defendant claimed and still claims as his own. It is not shown by
the evidence that the dealings in the trade-store at Natchez ever
embraced transactions in vouchers or whiskey; the defendant himself would not assert that they did; so that plaintiff's consent as
to the operations at that point could afford no protection for defendant's conduct in regard to those matters. And besides, the
defendant would not venture to deny what the plaintiff positively
asserts, that he knew nothing of the whiskey or voucher transactions of the defendant until long after the dissolution of the firm.
Manifestly plaintiff could not yield assent to nor waive that of
which he was ignorant. Even if it be conceded for the sake of
argument, that the defendant was permitted to withdraw from the
capital of the firm a considerable sum for his own use, still this
would by no means authorize the speculations into which he
plunged; and this is apparent for several reasons:First, the articles of copartnership expressly forbade them.
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Second, the sums which defendant might have drawn for his individual use were far exceeded in amount by those really employed
in such speculations. Third, it nowhere satisfactorily appears in
evidence that the amounts which could have been legitimately
drawn, were ever actually embarked in those speculations.
And, Fourth, that good faith which should be the animating
principle of all mercantile associations (all the authorities on partneikship speak this language), should have restrained the defendant from embarking the funds or credits of the firm, outside of
their legitimate scope and for his own individual benefit. For not
only are gross frauds committed by one partner against another
prohibited, but transactions of a more plausible nature, as intrigues
for private advantage, are held as offences against the partnership,
equally forbidden and therefore relievable in a court of equity:
Collier on Part., sect. 179; Smith Mere. Law 54; Featherstonhaugh v. .enwick, 17 Yesoy 298; Paweett v. Whltehouse, 1 Russ.
& My. 132; Russell v. Austwick, 1 Sim. 52. It has accordingly
been held that one partner is accountable in equity to his copartner for his proportion of the profits of a venture, although
outside of the firm's scope of business, if the money (or what is
tantamount thereto, the credits) of the firm, are used in such venture. For, as Lord ELDON says: "There is an implied obligation
among partners, to use the property for the benefit of those whose
property it is :" Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Yes. 218; Brown v.
Litton, 1 P. Wins. 140; Stoughton v. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch.467;
Collyer on Part., sect. 182. So far has the rule which requires
the utmost good faith between copartners prevailed, that where a
partner in violation of the partnership articles, but without using
the partnership funds therefor, embarks in outside enterprise, a
court of equity will decree his copartner as a partner with him in
such separate business: Collyer on Part., sects. 221-249; Somerville v. McKay, 16 Yes. 382. And a bill making such allegations has been held maintainable, and that an account could be
taken, although an action at law would lie for the breach of the
articles.
At the trial, the claim was seemingly urged by the defendant,
that as in 1864, plaintiff was loaning out the firm's money at six
or seven per cent. interest, and a considerable amount was also
lying idle in bank at New York, that therefore there was no impropriety in his using the firm funds in St. Louis, being charged,
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as he states he gave directions to the bookkeeper to do, with 8 per
cent. interest on call. But unfortunately for this shallow pretence, evidently an after-thought, no charge against the defendant
for interest (only a very inconsiderable sum) was ever made on
the books of the firm, notwithstanding the large sums he was constantly using. Even, however, had he been charged with interest
on every dollar he misappiopriated, still this would not be enough;
he must be held answerable as well for the profits he has derived
out of the partnership funds: Collyer on Part., sect. 182;
Stoughton v. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch.467; Brown v. Litton. 1 P.
Wins. 140; Story on Part., sect. 178. To such an extent have
courts of equity gone in this direction that if there be any doubt
as to whom the funds in such case belong, that doubt will be resolved in favor of the partnership and they will be held as belong.
ing thereto.
That every partner is the agent of his copartner is a very
familiar doctrine and it arises from the necessities of the partnership relation. A doctrine equally well settled, though not yet
hackneyed through frequent quotation, is that the same rules and
tests are applied to the conduct of partners as are ordinarily ap'plied to that of trhstees; and that the duties, functions, rights,
and obligations of partners may be for the most part comprehended
by the same words which define those of trustees and agents:
Collyer on Part., sect. 182; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., sects. 468, 628;
Kelly v. Greenleaf, 8 Story 93.
Mr. Justice STORY, in his elaborate work on Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 1, sect. 468, had remarked, in speaking of the duties of
agents, as follows:" Courts of equity adopt very enlarged views in regard to the
rights and duties of agents, and in all cases where the duty of
keeping regular accounts and vouchers is imposed upon them, they
will take care that the omission to do so shall not be used as a
means of escaping responsibility or of obtaining undue recompense.
* * * * Upon similar grounds an agent is bound to keep
the property of his principal separate from his own; if he mixes
it up with his own the whole will be taken, both at law and in
equity, to be the property of his principal, until the agent puts
the subject-matter under such circumstances that it may be distinguished as satisfactorily as it might have been before the unauthorized mixture on his part. In other words, the agent is put to the
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necessity of showing clearly what part of the property belongs to
him; and so far as he is unable to do this, it is treated as the
property of his principal. Courts of equity do not in these cases
proceed upon the notion that strict justice is done between the
parties, but upon the ground that it is the only justice that can be
done; and that it would be inequitable to suffer the fraud or negligence of the agent to prejudice the rights of his principal." At
a-subsequent period in the case of Zelly v. Greenleaf,3 Story 93,
where a member of a firm had failed to keep proper books of account so that the firm property could be distinguished from his
own, the learned judge cites the passage just quoted with approval,
and remarks with emphasis, "Every word of thispassageis equally
applicable to the case of a partner acting as the agent of a partnership." And this was precisely the status of the defendant; not only
did the law imply but his own express contract required that he
should see to it that the books of the firm were fairly and honestly
kept, and this was especially the ease as the plaintiff was acting
for the firm in New York while he had the personal management
of the business in St. Louis, and nothing but a flagrant disregard
of his partnership relations could have induced him to sadly neglect his duty in this particular and afterwards aggravate the
wrong thus committed, by taking advantage of his culpable omission
and neglect. But he will not be permitted to employ his dereliction from duty "as a means of escaping responsibility" or of
obtaining more than his proper portion of the partnership effects.
As to the exact amount of the partnership funds which the
defendant has converted to his own use in the purchase of the
articles referred to, is an inquiry which will probably never receive
an answer in anywise approaching exactitude. * * * [Here
follows an examination of the items of evidence, not of general
interest.]
Whether the defendant knew that the balance-sheet furnished
the plaintiff was incorrect, is wholly immaterial now to inquire.
For the assertion to the injury of another of something not known
to be true, is equally reprehensible both in morals and law, as
that which is known to be false: Sto. Eq. Jur., sec. 193. The
defendant denies having asserted the correctness of the balancesheet, but the seeming lack of candor he exhibited when testifying,
the apparently evasive and contradictory replies he gives in
response to questions propounded to him; his failure to satisfac-
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torily answer whenever asked to tell of dates, amounts and other
facts with which it would seem he must be familiar, render any
statement he may make, open to very jealous observation.
But whether he made any such representation or not does not
at all affect his present liability. The relations of trust and confidence existing between the plaintiff and himself placed him under
an equitable obligation to communicate all he knew of the matter
then pending to plaintiff to "make a clean breast of it," to disclose all the material facts within his knowledge touching the
negotiation then in progress as fully as though he had stepped
upon the witness-standand kissed the book, and nothing short of a
complete disclosure of this sort could exonerate the defendant
from the charge of undue concealment, which, under circumstances
like the present, is in the sense of a court of equity itself a fraud:
I Sto. Eq. Jur. §§ 204, 205, 207, 213, 214, 215, 216, 220; Bank
of the Republic v. Baxter, 31 Vt. 101; Hartin v. Greene, 10 Mo.
652 ; Jillett v. U. N. Bc., 56 Mo. 304 ; Bruce v. Ruler, 17 Eng.
C. L. 290; Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662; Madderford v. Austick, 1 Sim. 89. The doctrine here 'asserted, that confidence
reposed, and the fullest disclosure, are, in equity, correlative
terms, is one in full accord with the authorities above mentioned,
and must commend itself to the cordial approval of every just
mind, while it rebukes the manifestations of that spirit which, looking to its own advantage, is too prone to disregard the rights of
those to whom it owes the fealty incident to intimate and confidential association.
In briefly commenting upon the evidence I have hitherto omitted to make mention of that wonderful book in which defendant
kept the accounts of his whiskey operations, or of the peculiar and
perilous vicissitudes through which it passed. At one time it was
wholly consumed by fire; at another it met with only a partial
destruction ; but, surviving all the destructive agencies arrayed
against it, it is still extant, except that portion which records
defendant's transactionsin whiskey.
It is simply impossible to review this portion of defendant's testimony and listen to his flimsy excuses and ever-varying reasons in
reference to this book, without being fully impressed with the idea
that he destroyed that portion of it which he did destroy, for far
more cogent reasons than any he has yet seen fit to divulge. And
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this is made more especially apparent from the fact that the dostrnyed entries were not contained in any other book.
As the point has been referred to, rather than pressed in argu-

ment, I will refrain from discussing the question whether the rule
in odium srpoliatorisis applicable to the facts of the case. The rule
is certainly one of great stringency, and therefore should not be
resorted to but in extreme cases, and where other means of proof
fail.
I [aving thus considered .the results properly deducible from the
evidence, the sufficiency of the petition will next be discussed ; and
in reference to this, it may be observed that it states a cause of
action, if fraud of the character charged therein and established by
that evidence, constitutes any ground whatever for invoking remedial justice. And the petition concludes with a prayer for general
relihf which will authorize any relief consistent with the facts alleged. This was true under the old practice, and is more especially the case under the new.
Whether the petition (if the bill of sale, while it stands, is to be
reg.rded as an insuperable barrier to any relief) should have gone
farther in its allegations, asked rescission of the contract and offered
to surrender the 275,000, the consideration specified in the bill
as a condition precedent to having an account taken of the matter
complained of, a ready and satisfactory reply is, the petition passed
unchallenged at the hands of the defendant, and it is rather late in
the day, after lie has pleaded to the merits and had a trial in which
he enjoyed all the benefits which lie could have had, even if the
petition had been a model of perfection, for him to now come forward with the assertion that the petition is faulty in the particular
referred to.
It is a fact, it would seem, not generally recognised, or at least
frequently ignored, that we have in this state, a code; that by
that code are provided the forms of all pleadings, and the rules by
which they are to be tested; 2,W. S. 1012 § 1; and under the
rules thus laid down in our Practice Act, if the petition, however
inartificially drawn, do but state a cause of action and no objections
are taken to the formal sufficiency of its allegations, either by demurrer or by answer, "the defendant shall be deemed to have
waived the same :" Id. § 10, p. 1015. "If the substantial averments are there, and the adversary overlooks mere formal defects,
his statutory riplit to indulge in critical objections is swallowed up
VOL.
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in his statutory waiver; thenceforward be must address himself
to the merits of the case ;" BEfrank v. Seiler, 54 Mo. 134; .Russel
v. State Ins. Co., 55 Mo. 585; and "if the allegations of the
petition entitle the plaintiff to any measure of redress, a deaf ear
will be turned to his complaint, simply because be thinks justice
should be dispensed to him in a particular way, other than and
different from that to which he is actually entitled :" Riddle v.
Ramsey, 52 Mo. 153. And our legislature, as if determined, by
"line upon line and precept upon precept," to inculcate a liberal
construction of pleadings, has, in a subsequent chapter, given,
among others, this additional mandate: "The court shall, in every
stage of the action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings
or proceedings, which shall not affect the substantial rights of the
adverse party :" 2 W. S. § 5, p. 1034.
Now, it is difficult to conceive in what way the "substantial
rights" of the defendant have been prejudicially affected by the
failure of the petitioner to allege plaintiff's willingness to surrender
the proceeds of the sale, conceding for the moment that such allegation was necessary. But this concession will not be made, and
among others, for the reason, that a court of equity looks not so
much to the legal formalities with which a transaction is clothed as
to its very pith and substance. So that even if the bill of sale were
broad enough inform to comprehend all the interests which the
defendant claims it did, yet as it is conclusively manifest from the
evidence that the minds of the plaintiff and the defendant never
met and concurred in the sale of those matters of which the plaintiff was ignorant and which the defendant concealed-equity, in
consideration of the fraud practised, and disregarding mere technical forms, will hold that nothing passed by the bill of sale but such
matters as both parties had in view at the time of its execution and
delivery.
Thus, it has been held, that if an instrument is so general in its
terms as to release the rights of a party to property to which he
was totally ignorant that he had any title, and which was not in
the contemplation of the bargain at the time it was made, in such
cases the instrument will be restrained to the purposes of the bargain and the release confined to the right intended to be released
or extinguished: Ram sden v. Hylton, 2 Ves. 305; 1 Sto. Eq.
Jur. § 145.
But it is with no small degree of inconsistency that the de-

